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Competition policy in the 
Common Market 
by Hans von der Groeben 
Member of the Common Market Commission 
Until  fairly  recently  it was  left  to individual 
states alone to create a just  and humane economic 
order.  Today  the  European  Economic  Com­
munity is  also  faced  with  this  task.  For three 
reasons it is not an easy one. 
In the  first  place,  each  of the six  Community 
states - Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands - already has 
its  own  economic  system  which  by  no  means 
corresponds with the others on all points. Each 
country in the Community has its own history 
and its own set of values, and these are reflected 
in its economic policies. In view of these diver­
gences,  what can and should be  the economic 
system of the Community as a whole? 
The second  difficulty  arises from  the  need  for 
the Community'S emerging economic system to 
meet the requirements ofintra-Community trade, 
and to lead to economic union, i.e. to a gradual 
fusion  of the  six  national  economies.  In  this 
there  are  no  precedents  to  guide  us.  In  the 
economic,  legal,  political,  psychological,  and 
even  linguistic  fields,  we  are  faced  with  new 
questions to which there are as yet no proven 
answers. 
Thirdly,  a  Community  policy  for  inter­
national trade still has to be put into force. Here, 
too, we are largely facing entirely new problems, 
whether in respect of the states associated with 
the Six, policy towards less developed countries, 
or the creation of an Atlantic partnership. 
Thus  in  the  Community  three  economic 
systems are today superimposed on one another: 
that of the six individual member countries; the 
nascent  Community  system;  and  the  inter­
national economic  system,  which  is  influenced 
by  both the other two  and is,  at the moment, 
only partly worthy of being called an economic 
system at all. 
By an economic  system 1 mean the sum of all 
the  arrangements  which  serve  to  guide  the 
economic process at any given  time.  What can 
and should be the nature of these arrangements 
in the Common Market and in trade with the 
free world? Can the principles which apply, for 
instance,  to  trade within  the  German  Federal 
Republic, i.e. the principles ofamarket economy, 
be applied to this wider  sphere? What special 
problems arise? Are there any alternatives? 
These  are the questions confronting the Com­
munity  institutions.  Like  all  forms  of policy, 
economic policy is the art of moulding a given 
situation  to  meet  desired  ends.  To  do  this 
successfully, and to take the right action at the 
right time, the constantly changing facts, trends, 
and other circumstances  must be continuously 
recorded  and analyzed.  The experience  of the 
world economic crisis in the twenties and early 
thirties shows that economic policy can only be 
completely successful if measures are not taken 
in isolation,  if they  do not conflict  with  each 
other, and if they do not cancel each other out ­
if,  in short,  they  are all based on one guiding 
principle,  an overall  approach,  and  are them­
selves  co-ordinated.  There  must  be a  rational 
connection  between  the  initial  situation,  the 
aims  pursued,  the guiding  principles,  and  the 
methods  of economic  policy  applied  by  the 
Community. 
3 1  The problem 

The facts  about the European Community's progress since 
1957  are well  known. It is  more than half way  along  the 
road  to  a  full  customs  union  between  the  six  member 
countries;  industrial  duties  have  been  cut by  70  per cent 
of their January 1957 level; and all quotas in trade between 
the Six have been abolished; and for imports from outside 
,the  Community  the  member  countries  have  eliminated 
60  per cent of the  difference  between their national tariffs 
and the duty  levels  of the Community's common external 
tariff. 
The  first  important  steps  have  also  been  ·taken  on  the 
road to economic  union by  evolving  a common approach 
to  agricultural  policy,  competition  policy,  measures  con­
cerning state aids. the  free  movement  of persons,  services 
and capital. and freedom  of  establishment. 
But we still have  a long way  to go to achieve economic 
union. and we  cannot act as though it already existed.  No 
market  in  any  product  is  yet  characterized  throughout 
the  Community  by  conditions  similar  to  those  obtaining 
on  a domestic  market; true competition is  still prevented. 
restricted or distorted by a wide variety of factors based on 
the  traditional  national  divisions.  The  main  obstacles  to 
competition and trade  are: customs barriers. tax barriers. 
state  trading  monopolies,  subsidies.  cartels.  transport 
barriers,  restrictions  on  free  establishment  and  the  move­
ment of capital, discriminations in patent regulations. and 
disparities  in  company  law,  legislation  on  foodstuffs  and 
pharmaceutical products, the laws regulating standards ~d 
competition law. Finally, barriers caused by exchange rates 
are making themselves  increasingly  felt. 
These  are  the  main obstacles  to competition  and  trade 
within  the  Community.  However. they  are"only  one  side, 
") '. 

in  a  sense  ·the  outer  skin,  of  the  situation  in  which  our 

member  countries  find  themselves.  Inside,  we  have  six 

different  economic  orders  with  varying  structures,  six 

different legal systems, and six social systems, each with its 

own  peculiar structure. 

("  In Germany, there is  the "social market economy". The 
economic systems of the other member countries also bear 
the  stamp  of  the  market economy.  though  in some  ways 
they differ appreciably from  the German model. In France 
there  is  a market economy  with  a superstructure of plan­
ning  and  intervention.  In  Italy.  where  the  outlines  of  a 
five-year  economic  plan  including  social  aims  have  been 
published,  there  <is  a  market economy  directed mainly  via 
the big public undertakings. In the Netherlands the market 
economy approach is coupled with overall analytical fore­
casts intended to provide  the  authorities,  the  two sides of 
i  industry, and management with  guidance on the effects  to 
: be expected from  any given measure. 
,  Thus two questions arise. Firstly, does the concept of the" ') 
superiority of an  economy based upon competition, which _. 
is valid for the separate national economic areas, hold good 
also in ,the initial stages of a common market? In the above 
conditions,  in  fact,  is  competition  an  adequate  means  of 
achieving conditions similar to those  found  in a  domestic 
market, and, if so, what institutions, what measures, what 
economic  policy  are  needed to make the  concept of com- . 
petition  an effective  instrument  of  integration?  Secondly, 
under what conditions can competition assume  the  role of 
an  instrument  to  guide  the  economy  of  a  "domestic" 
market  on  a  Community  scale  once  it  has  come  into 
existence, and what  economic  policy measures are  needed 
for  this  purpose? 
4 2  Competition as an instrument 
of integration 
We  have  faced  the  first  question  - the  efficiency  of 
competition  as  an  instrument  of  integration  and  its 
encouragement by means of a  suitable policy - ever since 
the Common Market came into being. It will continue to 
exercise us  until the whole of the Community is a  single, 
internal market. 
The ends and means of the 
RomeTreaty 
This  question  can  only  be  answered  if  the  ends  to  be 
attained are known.  The Rome Treaty sets  them  out in 
Article  2: harmonious development of economic activity. 
continuous  and  balanced  economic  expansion.  increased 
economic  stability.  a  faster  improvement  in  living  stan­
dards, and closer relations between the member countries. 
The Treaty also indicates in varying details what means. 
i.e.  what measures and procedures, are to be used for the 
attainment  of these  objectives.  To mention  only  a  few: 
the  dismantling  of  tariffs,  the  removal  of  obstacles  to 
freedom  of  movement  of  persons,  goods,  services  and 
capital, the introduction of a  system  of undistorted com­
petition.  the  co-ordination  of  economic  policy.  and  the 
alignment of the member states' legislative provisions. 
It  is  clear  from  the  more  than  one  hundred  Treaty 
provisions in :this field  that co-ordination of the economic 
programs of the Community  countries is  to be achieved 
by the play of market-economy forces and not at the behest 
of a single central authority. There is, therefore. no question 
of the Community having to choose between merging  the 
national  markets  under  a  central  plan  and  allowing  a 
balance  to  emerge  between  the  forces  of  supply  and 
demand.  mainly through  the price  mechanism.  The only 
question  is  whether the merging  of the marketS  and the 
economic  objectives  of the Community  can  be  attained 
most  quickly  and  most  efficiently  through, the  effective 
degree  of  competition  available  at  each  stage  in  the 
development of the Common Market, or whether further 
measures - in addition to the promotion of compc;tition ­
are necessary because of the restrictions on and di$lortions 
of competition still persisting in trade between the ;inember 
countries. 
The effects of freer trade and 
competition on national economies 
First let us consider the effects of free international trade ­
based on competition - on national  economies  involved. 
The theory of international trade states that free, or freer. 
trade  leads  to  increased  prosperity  in  all  the  countries 
taking  part.  Under  perfect  competitive  conditions  the 
price  mechanism  automatically ensures  that each country 
specializes in the goods for whose production it is relatively 
best suited.  and that it only imports goods which  it can 
obtain more cheaply  abroad than by producing them  at 
home. Free or freer trade thus permits greater international 
division of labour. If goods are imported at a  price with 
which  industry at home cannot compete. it is  obliged to 
reduce output or go over to other lines of production. The 
factors which move over to other fields of production can 
then  operate  more  economically.  and  turn  out  greater 
volumes of the goods which consumers require. 
The effects of freer trade  and 

competition on integration 

The degree  of freer  trade  already  achieved  between  the 
Community  countries.  i.e.  the  considerable  reduction  of 
duties and the abolition of quotas. has led to a substantial 
improvement  of competition.  In so  far  as  customs  and 
quota barriers have  been lowered.  and are being further 
lowered,  new  business  opportunities  have  emerged  for 
industry  and  commerce.  When  these  opportunities  are 
seized.  greater  competition  ensues,  as  can be  seen  from 
the  increase  in the volume  of intra-Community  trade  by 
166  per cent between  1958  and 1964. 
Thus the role of competition as a  factor in integration, 
by expanding the national markets and gradually me~g 
them, has steadily grown  in importance. The  progressive 
and  reciprocal  opening  of  markets  has  increased  the 
number  of competitors;  competition  has become  keener. 
and productivity has risen. Monopolies and cartels in some 
countries are finding themselves threatened. and the oligo­
polistic  market  positions  of  other  companies  are  being 
undermined.  In tum. growing  competition  stimulates  the 
manufacturers' will and determination to enter markets in 
other member countries so far reserved to their competitors. 
They are consequently  led  to apply  the  best  production 
methods and so promote technical progress. The emergence 
of  wider  markets  also  makes  it  possible  to  exploit  the 
advantages of large-scale mass  production. With growing 
competition  the  most  efficient  manufacturer  or  service 
provider can reduce his prices. which obliges the high-cost 
competitor to rationalize and so bring down his own costs. 
With prices thus  reduced. or at any rate  prevented from 
rising. the real incomes of workers are boosted or at the 
very least maintained. The degree of economic integration 
. so far attained in the Six may be said to be mainly due 
to the  pressure  which  growing  competition  has  exerted 
on the economic  behaviour of those  participating in the 
market. Its function  as a  mainspring and driving force in 
integrating the Six markets is  undeniable. 
5 3  Competition policy in the 
Common Market 
") .., 
We have already seen that freer (as opposed to completely 
free) trade and competition in the COlIlmon Market has led 
to an increase in the gross national product of all member 
countries,  and  that  competition,  albeit  in  many  cases 
limited or distorted by cartels, monopolies, state aids, and 
fiscal  and  other  regulations,  performs  a  decisive  and 
successful  function  in  integration  ....;  to  the  benefit  of the 
Common Market as a whole. 
However,  it  is  certain that the  influence  of  the  market 
mechanism  in  co-ordinating  individual  plans  is  different, 
under  conditions  of state  and  private  intervention,  from 
what it would be if there were no distortions and limitations 
of competition. Trade and competition take place not only 
between the national economies of the Six but even more 
between individual firms.  From the standpoint of the firms 
and  industries  affected,  distortions  of  competition  often 
look different than when  seen  from  the  standpoint of the 
economy  as  a whole. 
Thus  keener  and freer  competition  between  enterprises 
is  not in  itself sufficient.  In order that the  companies and 
national economies  involved may derive maximum benefit 
from  the economic  advantages of a  competitive  economy, 
and  in order to share these advantages fairly and to com­
plete the integration process, it is also necessary to eliminate 
artificial  distortions  and  restrictions  of competition.  Even 
if  artificial assistance  to a particular economic sector in  a 
member state is  of advantage to the overall economies of 
the other member states, we  cannot assume  that ,this  will, 
in  fact,  be  acceptable  to  these  states.  They  may  take 
countermeasures.  which  will  make  integration more  diffi­
cult.  Such  countermeasures,  together  with  uncertainty  as 
to  how  long  the  resultant  distortions  of competition  will 
last.  impede  the  optimum  division  of  labour.  Since  the 
First World War these  artificial distortions of competition 
have  proliferated,  and  today  their  abolition  is  at  least 
as  important to  the  achievement  of a  single  economy  as 
the removal  of long-standing barriers to trade. 
This is where the work of the Community'S competition 
policy  proper  begins:  it  must  eliminate  these  distortions 
and restrictions. or at least reduce them to a tolerable level 
for  the  firms  affected  and  for  the  Community  generally. 
The aim: effective competition 
To  achieve  this  aim  we  must  first  know  what criteria to 
apply and what form of competition we wish to introduce. 
Should  our model  be  perfect competition,  or some  other 
market  arrangement?  The  answer  is  that the  aim  ought 
not to be any particular economic model. but a workable 
system 'of 'competition.  This  means' seeking  not' perfect 
competition  between  unlimited :numbers  of  firms  but a 
system of competition that is effective in practice. The first 
essential of this is ,that any change in  supply and demand 
should be  reflected  in  prices. which  should be the expres­
sion  of economic  scarcity  and not the  result· of subsidies. 
monopolies  or cartels.' Nor can competition  be effective 
unless  there  is  open  access  to markets,  i.e. 'unless  new 
competitors  can  enter them  freely  and are not  prevented 
from  doing  so  by  cartels,  dominant  enterprises  or  state 
action.  Competition  in  this  dynamic  sense  represents  the 
opportunity  for  every  competitor  to  expand  his  business 
at the expense  of other competitors. 
The  issue  is  therefore  the  creation,  maintenance  and 
promotion  of  competition  which  stimulates  and  rewards 
efficiency and ensures a primary distribution of income and 
wealth consonant with performance. Only such competition 
can create a sufficiently broad basis for a secondary distri- .,,, 
bution of income and wealth, i.e. one consonant with social  ) 
justice.  '. "'. 
Specific distortions of competition 
We  can distinguish  between  specific  distortions.  i.e.  those 
working to the advantage or detriment of g,iven  industries 
or given classes of firms, and general distortions, i.e.  work­
ing  to  the  advantage  or detriment of  the  entire  economy 
of  one  or more  member  states.  We  shall  begin  with  the 
specific  distortions.  dealing  first  with  state  aids. 
State aids, preferential fiscal and transport rates 
The most important case is that in which one member state 
supports a  given industry by  exempting  i~ from a  tax,  b~ 
directly subsidizing it  from  public funds.  or by  according 
it particularly low  transport rates up to the frontier. while 
the other member states do not grant any of these  advan­
tages  to  the  corresponding  industry  in  their  countries. 
Alternatively.  the  different  member  states  may  all  grant 
such  aids.  but in varying  form  and  volume.  Such  action 
affects the function of prices as  a gauge of scarcity. Firms 
enjoying such protection make supplementary profits which 
are in  no way  related to their efficiency.  but are made at 
the  expense  of  firms  that  have  to  depend  on  their  own 
efficiency;  or  these  protected  firms  cause  losses  to  the 
national economy  by employing production ·factors Which.') 
would  be more  economically  employed  elsewhere.  ". 
The  European  Commission  is  giving  priority  to  these 
questions.  and is  demanding  the  elimination of such  dis­
tortions of competition or, when elimination does not seem 
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possible,  a  harmonization  of aid  systems  throughout  the 
Community. 
Restraint of competition by firms 
The  gradual  merging  of  the  six  markets  is  creating  new 
conditions to which  those  engaged  in  business  must con­
stantly adjust themselves.  But businessmen can themselves 
hamper. delay or limit this process ·of adjustment through 
agreements  restricting  competition  between  firms;  parti­
cularly effective  are  restrictions on competitors' access  to 
the  market,  through  horizontal  and  reciprocal  exclusive­
dealing  agreements,  agreements  on  market-sharing,  and 
the fixing  of production or sales  quotas and of prices.  In 
these  circumstances.  prices  cannot  change  in  accordance 
with variations in supply  and demand; they are no longer 
,the  expression of economic scarcity, and cease to regulate 
investment and to stimulate growth. 
Once the  procedural conditions had been laid  clown  in 
1962  by  a  Council regulation  on the  basis  of a  proposal 
of the Commission (I), the Commission began to deal with 
cartels of this kind as a matter of priority. Thejirst recom­
mendation  it issued  concerned  an international  cartel' in 
the building industry ["Convention Faience" (2)]  in which 
manufacturerS,  traders  and  builders  undertook  to  deal 
exclusively  with  each  other  and  impose  limitations  on 
market access  by  other traders.  The Commission  recom­
mended  that  these  restrictions  be  eliminated,  and  the 
parties concerned  accepted  the recommendation. 
In another case of a collective and reciprocal exclusive­
dealing  system  in  the  building  industry,  involving  agree­
ments  on  prices.  quotas  and  market  sharing  (3),  the 
Commission  informed  the considerable number of under­
takings  involved  that  it  was  of  the  opinion,  after  a 
preliminary  examination,  that  these  restraints  on  com­
petition infringed the Common Market Treaty's prohibition 
of  cartels  (Article  85,  para.  1.  which  bans  price-fixing, 
production and sales quotas, restriction of technical deve­
lopment,  market-sharing.  discrimination.  and  tied  sales) 
and  were  not  eligible  for  exemption  under  Article  85, 
para. 3 (which permits agreements to improve production 
or  distribution  and  to  promote  technical  and  economic 
progress, provided they are not restrictive and do not allow 
the firms concerned to eliminate competition). This meant 
that  the  firms  involved  lost  their  protection  against  the 
imposition of fines  (Article  IS, para. 6 of Council Regula­
tion.  No.  17).  The  firms  were  called  upon  to end  their 
infringement of the ban on cartels within a specified time. 
Finally, the decision  in the Grundig-Consten case (4) is 
worth  mentioning.  Under  this  decision  the  Commission 
banned an exclusive-dealing agreement involving absolute 
territorial protection, and making Consten  the  sole  distri­
butor  of  Grundig  products  in  France.  For this  pUIJX>SC 
Grundig imposed an export ban on all its dealers in other 
countries, so  that French customers  could obtain supplies 
of  Grundig· products  only  from  Consten.  In  addition. 
Grundig  and. Consten  had signed  a  supplementary agree­
ment on the use in France of a special trade mark ("Gint"), 
the  aim  of  which  was  also  to prevent  firms  other  than 
Consten from importing Grundig products into the country. 
The  Commission  found  that the  agreement  in  this  form 
infringed the ban in Article 85. para.  1 of ,the Treaty, and 
also  that  it  could  not  be  authorized  under  Article  85, 
para.  3.  The  Commission  also  forbade  Grundig  and 
Consten  to obstruct rival imports into France. 
In all. five  decisions  [Grosfillex  (5),  Bendix (6), Vitapro 
(7).  Grundig  (8),  Deca  (9)];  one recommendation  ["Con­
vention Faience" (10)]; and one notice of prohibition [(11) 
Article  15.  para.  6  of  Council  Regulation  No.  17]  have 
been issued so far. Further decisions will follow.  However, 
the  investigation  of  cartel  cases,  especially  major  inter­
national ones,  takes some  time. 
In the matter of firms holding dominant positions in the 
market, the Treaty prohibits only the abuse of such  posi~ 
tions.  The legal  and  economic  difficulties  in  interpreting 
Article 86 are considerable. Experience in applying it has 
been small, and no complaints have yet been made to the 
Commission.  Such  abuses  are  also  difficult  to  detect  by 
official investigation. Experience will show whether indivi­
dual  firms  in  dominant  position  can be subjected  to  an 
effective  check  on  abuse  by  using  the  Treaty's provision 
for  general  investigations  by  economic  sector. 
Of late. an increasing number of mergers has taken place 
in  the  Community,  and  they  may  affect  competition  in 
much the same way as cal1tels. In conformity with the plans 
foreshadowed in its 1962 Action Program. the Commission 
has put in hand a number of studies and investigations to 
clarify the  legal  situation of such  mergers  in the light of 
(1) 	 Rea.  No.  17.  10U'1Ial  olfklel  des  Com","1IlIUlls  euro"';t!1I1Ies  (JO)  P.  204 
(1962) 
(2) 	 BUlletin  of the  EEC. No.  S.  Mall  1964.  P.  46 
(3) 	 BEC  CommissiOD  PretIII  Release  IP(64)  loIS  of  September  16.  1964 
(4) 	 JO P.  2545 (1962) 
(5) 	 JO P. 915  (1964) 
(6) 	 JO p. 1426 (1964) 
(7) 	 10 p. 2281  (1964) 
(8) 	 See  Note 4 above 
(9) 	 JO P.  2761  (964) 
(10)  See  Note 2  above 
(II)  See  Note 3 above 
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the Rome Treaty's provisions. These do not constitute an 
investigation of the· problem of economic concentration in 
goneral;  when  that is  undertaken, many other considera­
tions will have to be taken into account in addition to the 
maintenance of eftcctive competition. 
Moreover.  competition  has  always  been  regarded  and 
promoted by the  Common Market Commission  not  only 
as an instrument of economic integration and guidance but 
also as a means of preserving freedom of economic activity. 
Cartel. monopoly and merger law is therefore an essential 
element  in  the  Community's  economic  system.  which  is 
based on freedom  and a  market economy. 
The consumer  is  interested  not only  in low  prices  but 
also in having the widest possible choice of goods. Only a 
plentiful supply of products offers him the chance to choose 
what he needs.  Such freedom of choice for the consumer 
is desirable  not only on economic grounds. however.  but 
also on social grounds. It is an essential feature of our free 
society; and since competition-increases the supply of goods 
in  the  wider  Community  market  and  thus  enlarges  the 
consumer's freedom of choice. it is not only an instrument 
for guiding the economy but also a  factor in  shaping our 
social  order. 
The counterpart to the consumer's freedom  of choice is 
the entrepreneur's freedom to operate in the market. which 
should as  a  rule  (12)  be limited  solely  by  the economic 
principles of the market. Only if the entrepreneur attempts 
to evade or invalidate these  principles are limits imposed 
on  him  by the law - notably through legislation  against 
restriction  of competition  and against unfair competition. 
The freedom of action allowed to an operator in the market 
thus reaches its limits when the corresponding freedom  of 
another operator is  suppressed or curtailed through restric­
tive or unfair practices. This is what gives competition its 
constitutional.  social  and  democratic  significance  and 
function. 
In  order  to  safeguard  freedom  of  competition  it  is 
necessary  to ensure that competition is fair.  Unfair com­
petition  and  dumping  are  abuses  'of  the  freedom  to 
compete.  Accordingly.  the  Rome  Treaty  provides  for 
measures  against  intra-Community  dumpiIlg.  So  far.  in 
all cases  where complaints of dumping have  been shown 
to be justified the Commission has succeeded in stopping it 
without  delay.  The Treaty makes no provision  for Com­
munity  rules  against  other  forms  of unfair  competitioIl. 
Here national  laws  come  into  play.  and the  question  of 
whether and how far these need to1>e aligned is at present 
still being studied. 
Public undertakings and monopolies 
The  existing  national  laws  governing  market  conditions 
also  raise  difficult  questions  for  competition  policy.  The 
Common Market Treaty is gradually divesting the member 
states of the  traditional instruments for  influencing  trade 
between Community countries: customs duties. quantitative 
restrictions.  and  limitations  on  the  free  movement  of 
persons,  goods.  services  and capital.  In this  way  oppor­
tunities are created which. if exploited. result in competi­
tion across frontiers. The Treaty protects that competition; 
it  gives the Community and the member states no powers 
to intervene directly in entrepreneurial planning and opera­
tions.  which  are  co-ordinated  through  the  play  of  the 
market. including  prices. 
On the other hand. the state is  itself an entrepreneur in 
a number of cases. Through public enterprises and trading 
monopolies it can exert the same limiting effects on trade 
and competition as through the traditional measures listed ". ""' .. ' 
above.  In particular, it can  place  public enterprises  in a  '. "J 
more  favourable  position  than  their  private  competitors. 
For this reason the Common Market Treaty lays down 
that by  1970  the member states must have adjusted their 
trading  monopolies  so  as  to  remove  all  discrimination 
between public and private undertakings in the conditions 
of supply and marketing.  As regards  their public  under­
takings.  Article  90.  para.  I,  requires  member  states  to 
refrain from enacting or maintaining in force any measure 
contrary to the rules on cartels and aid. Article 90, para. 2. 
further  provides  that  the  cartel  and aid  provisions  shall 
also  apply to public  undertakings. 
What  does  this  adjustment  of state  monopolies  entail? 
Is it enough  for  a  member state  to eliminate  individua.l 
discriminations while maintaining the exclusive import and 
marketing rights of the monopoly? Or must direct access 
to its market be made available for competitors from other 
member states? Does the guarantee of equal marketing and 
supply  conditions  for  both  the  trading  monopoly  and 
private  enterprise  mean  that  the  state  monopoly's  com­
petitors shall enjoy the same freedom  of movement in the 
latter's market as the monopoly has in the markets of  its 
competitors? If it does not. would it  be possible to speak 
of equal conditions of competition and. from  1970  on. of 
conditions throughout the Community similar to those  of 
a  single  internal market?") 
These are the most important questions  regarding state ..... 
monopolies  (Article  37).  The  same  basic  principle  holds 
(12)  Cf.  Medlu",·le,,,,  eco"omic  pollclf  below.  under  111,  fourth  section 
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good  here as in  interpretatiog the general prohibition of 
state action which has effects similar to cartels or of aids 
favouring public enterprises (Article 90. para. I): that the 
rules  of  competition  must  be  applied  unifbrmly  to  all 
undertakings. public or private. 
The  regulation  of  markets  by  the  public  authorities 
should therefore only be allowed to an extent compatible 
with  the  Community's  competition  rules.  Furthermore. 
where  public  undertakings  engage  in  inter-state  trade, 
competition.  not  state  direction  of  their  entrepreneurial 
activity, must be the means by which the Common Market 
comes about. 
In this matter the European Commission is  faced  with 
difficult.  often  delicate  problems  that  cannot  be  solved 
overnight.  Initial successes  have  been achieved,  however, 
and further  steps  will follow. 
General distortions  of competition 
So  far  I  have  been  concerned  with  distortions  and 
restrictions  of competition  working  to  the  advantage  or 
disadvantage of specific  industries or firms.  To eliminate, 
harmonize or control  these  distortions  and restrictions  is 
one task of Community competition policy. The provisions 
of  the  Rome  Treaty  and  various  enforcing  regulations 
already make it possible for the Commission to work out 
and to apply  more and more fully  a  common  policy  on 
cartels,  intra-Community  dumping.  state  trading  mono­
polies. and subsidies. 
But experience has shown that this  is  not enough. 00 
the  contrary.  differences  in  the  economic  policies  of  the 
member states can also lead to general distortions of the 
conditions of trade and competition between the states, and 
these distortions cannot be eliminated by the measures so 
far mentioned. This is the point where competition policy 
becomes inextricably linked with general economic policy. 
Economic and monetary disparities 
The overvaluation of a  currency encourages imports and 
hinders exports; undervaluation has the reverse effect. Both 
lead  to  a  general· distortion.  to  the  advantage  or  dis­
advantage of an economy competing in a common market. 
and adjustment requires a lengthy period. The efficiency of 
the  price  mechanism  as a  gauge  of scarcity.  laboriously 
achieved  by  free  trade  and competition.  is  again  called 
into question when there are differing price and cost trends 
in the member states. and this deprives us of one condition 
for undistorted competition based  on performance.  When 
economic integration is well advanced, chanlCS in exchange 
rates are  not to be recommendod. because of the  abrupt 
alterations  they  cause  in the  intra-Community  terms  of 
trade. 
Thus the effectiveness  of Gompetition  as an instrument 
of integration and guidance in a common market depends 
primarily  on  the  equilibrium  of  the  overall  balance  of 
payments  of  each  individu3J.  member·  state.  This  equili­
brium does not come about automatically. 00 the contrary. 
inflation  can be  controlled and economic  stability  main­
tained  only  if  the  member  states  and  the  Community 
jointly employ the weapons of economic. monetary. budget 
and  fiscal  policy.  Because  of the  increasing  merging  of 
markets and the convertibility of national currencies,  the 
speed  with which  economic ftuotuations  spread  from  one 
member country to another is increasing all the time. The 
economic-policy instruments which anyone state can apply 
to keep the value of money stable are no longer adequate 
to control the development of the economy. 
Consequently. a major step towards the co-ordination of 
the  member countries' overall  economic  policies  came in 
the spring of 1964 when the Council of Ministers adopted 
a  Commission  proposal that it  should  recommend to the 
member states a number of measures to restore the balance 
of  economic  development  in  the  Community.  The chief 
measure recommended was a more restrictive state spend­
ing  policy,  under which  government expenditure was not 
to rise  more than 5 per cent in comparison with 1963, and 
any deficits  which  resulted were  to be financed  by long­
term loans. In addition. fiscal  measures were  to be  taken 
to  reduce  domestic  demand  if  this  proved  necessary. 
Finally, it was recommended that credit and incomes should 
be temporarily restricted. 
What contribution can the common competition policy 
make  to  the  task  of combating  ioftation  and  improving 
economic stability in the Community? 
The influence of competition between the member coun­
tries on productivity and prices is particularly important. If 
increasing competition speeds up progress in productivity. 
so that the trend of production keeps pace with wage rises 
in  important  industries.  total  production  will  keep  pa~e 
with purchasing power. At the same time. competition puts 
a  brake on intiationary increases  in  costs or demand. 
Furthermore. the lower prices brought about by competi­
tion can have considerable influence on the level of wages. 
When  these lower prices keep the cost of living stable or 
reduce  it,  a  major reason  for  wage  claims is eliminated. 
Effective competition will  also force  the  employer to put 
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up  stiffer  resistance  to  wage  claims  which  outstrip  pro., 
ductivity  advances. 
Finally,  the  effectiveness  of  general  economic-policy 
measures can be influenced by the intensity of competition: 
for. instance,  fiscal  and monetary  policy  measures can be 
nullified by monopolistic actions which increase prices and 
wages. 
These  examples show how  essential  it  is  for  economic 
and monetary  policy  to give  maximum encouragement  to 
effective  competition.  Competition  not  only  supplements 
but also conditions suoh policy, and vice versa. Today the 
one can.no longer function successfully without the other. 
Disparities in tax systems 
The second major task currently facing  the Community's 
economic  policy-makers  is  tbat  of  aligning  the  member 
states' turnover tax systems. Five of the countries apply the 
"cascade"  system  of  multi-stage  tax.  This  tax,  which  is 
levied each time a product changes hands during the course 
of manufacture or distribution, has a cumulative effect. But 
It  does  not  permit exact calculation of the compensatory 
levy  which  should  be charged on  imports  of comparable 
goods  or of the refund due on exports  in order to  avoid 
foreign buyers having to pay turnover tax twice. This leads 
to  distortions  in  inter-state  competition. Furthermore, the 
.. cascade"  system,  wi1h  its  cumulative  effect,  favours 
integrated  (generally  large)  enterprises,  while  small  non­
integrated  firms  are  at  a  disadvantage.  The  cumulative 
multi-stage  turnover  tax  therefore  gives  arbitrary  en­
couragement  to  vertical  integration,  with  all  its  conse­
quences  for  competition  and  the social  structure. 
For  these  reasons  the  Commission  proposed,  in  the 
autumn  of  1962,  that  the  .. cascade"  system  should  be 
replaced by an added-value tax system  of a kind which is 
already  in  use  in  one  member  state (France)  and  which 
does  not  impair  competition.  The  European  Parliament 
welcomed and supported the Commission's draft directive 
and made improvements to it.  Meanwhile, the broad lines 
of this common added-value tax system have been worked 
out. 
The  immediate  aim  of  this  general  attempt  to reform 
turnover taxation in five  member states is to eliminate the 
existing  distortions  of competition,  and the  ultimate  aim 
is  to  encourage  free  trade  and  competition  between  the 
member countries by abolishing tax frontiers and harmon­
izing  rates  of taxation  (13).  Like  customs  frontiers,  tax 
frontiers  with  their  physical  checks,  their  bureaucracy, 
their paperwork, ,their cost to the state and firms  and  last 
but not least, their psychological effects, are a  co~side;able 
obstacle tofr~e trade and to the creation. in the .Community 
of  conditions  similar  to  those  obtaining  jn  a  domestic 
market.  '.  .'  I 
Disparities in national economic legislation  '.. 
The differences in tax systems provide a major exam  Ie of 
the  distortions of competition  resulting  from  the  m mber 
states'  differing  legal  practices.  Accordingly,  the  Com­
munity's competition system  is  not limited  to form  ating 
certain  common  rules  of  competition  about  c  rtels. 
dominant firms,  dumping and state aids. but also in ludes 
the alignment of national legal practices which im  e the 
operation of  the  common market.  Thus tJhe  harmo izing 
of legislation  is  not  only  an essential  instrument  of com­
petition policy  but also one of the most important means 
of  achieving  European  integration  in  general.  .• 
The chapter of the Rome Treaty on the harmonittion 
of legislation  is  in Part Three,  and entitled  "Com~nity 
policy". Under the heading "Common Rules", the  ~reaty "J
codifies  the  rules  governing  competition,  the  fiscal  pro­
visions - aiming essentially at taxing trade in goods  .  cross 
frontiers  in  a  manner which  will  not impair competition, 
and harmonization of legislation.  I 
But the connection between harmonization of legis~ation 
and  the  European  rules  of  competition  is  even  closer  . 
Article  101  actually  provides  for  harmonizing  legislation 
when  .. a  disparity  existing  between  the  legislative  or 
administrative provisions of the member states distorts the 
conditions  of  compotitionin  the  common  market  and 
thereby causes a state of affairs which must be eliminab~d." 
In order  to  avoid  as  far  as  possible  future  distortions  of 
the conditions of competition by  the issue  of new  regula­
tions  in a member state, Article  102  further provides for 
preliminary consultation with the Commission, which then 
recommends  to  the  member  state  concerned  the  appro­
priate measures to avoid the particular distortion. 
The third and most important general Treaty provision 
concerning  harmonization  of  legislation  is  Article  100, 
which  runs as  follows: "The Council, acting by means of 
a  unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission, shall 
issue  directives  for  harmonizing  such  legislative  and 
administrative provisions  of the member states as have  8 
directincidmce on the estabUsbmmt or functioning of the 
common market." 
These three provisions, together with a number of special 
rules.  set  out  the  particular  function  and  object  of 
(13)  In;ts Il1itlaUve  1964  the  CommissIon  haa  alaee  ealled  for  the  elimination  of 
all frontlet contrOls.by  l!17O 
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harmonizing' member 'states'  legislation.  It is  an essential 
component ofthe platt set out in the Rome Treaty for the 
progressive  merging  of the  six  economies.  It is  therefore 
intended  to eliminate  differences  between  member states' 
laws which hinder this process of growing together into a 
common market with features similar to those of a domestic 
market. Hence ,the  harmonization of  legislation is  not an 
end in itself but serves specific purposes: the establishment 
and operation of the common' market and the creation of 
similar legal  conditions of competition. 
The aim  is therefore to create fair systems of competition 
and  economic  activity  by  appropriate  adaptation  of the 
member countries' economic legislation. The adaptation of 
national laws  must  be 'affected  in a  form  consonant with 
the existence of the Community, since  they must be able 
to  co-exist  with  Community  law  - the  Treaty  and  its 
implementing provisions - and to supplement it in accord­
ance  with  the aims of the Treaty. 
It is immediately clear that this aim cannot be reached 
by applying the cdteria normally valid forconfticts of laws 
in the traditional sense. Within a common market it is not 
sufficient  to  know  whether  this  or  that  national  law  is 
applicable. What matters is that the national law applicable 
to any given case shall conform substantively with the law 
applicable to competitors in other Communi,ty countries to 
an extent sufficient to preclude conflicts  of  substance and 
the distortions in inter-state competition to which they give 
rise. 
Which  fields  of law  has  the  Commission  tackled  first? 
The answer  is  simple:  the national provisions  whioh  are 
the most di,rect and persistent obstacle to the establishment 
of the common market. The effects of different levels and 
forms of turnover tax were the most immediately obvious. 
Work on harmonizing public law in the economic field has 
also  made progress,  particularly in the following  sectors : 
food  legislation,  pharmaceutical  products,  veterinary 
legislation,  public  contracts,  the  teohnical  provisions  for 
vehicles,  industrial safety  regulations. customs  legislation. 
and  legislation  regarding  executory  arrangements  and 
bankruptcy.  Another comprehensive  field  for  harmoniza­
tion is  freedom  of establishment in the Common Market. 
which  is  still  hindered  by  numerous  national  laws  and 
regulations. 
In the  field  of private law  the  Commission  is  concen­
trating  on  relating  to  patent.  trade-mark  and  design 
legislation. and on certain aspects of company law and of 
the  law against unfair competition. 
The  most  important instrument, for  the  harmonization 
of  laws  is  the" directive".  which  the  Colllmon  Market 
Council  of Ministers  issues  on  a  proposal  by  the  Com­
mission.  It is binding on each member state to which it is 
addressed in respect of its objectives. but leaves the choice 
of method to the national authorities. A further instrument 
is  the international convention. whioh  is  also designed  to 
create new Community substantive law and. consequently. 
standards which supplement the Treaty. Examples are the 
draft  conventions  on  a  Community  patent.  on  mutual 
recognition  of companies.  and on  the mutual recognition 
and enforcement of judgments. 
As regards method. the question arises whether harmon­
ization in any given field should aim at a standard attained 
in  the  majority  of  the  member  states.  or  at  the  most 
advanced  and most practical  standard appropriate to the 
conditions  and needs  of a  large  new  economic  and legal  ' 
area. The Commission's attitude to this question is shown 
by its proposal to extend the added-value tax system. which 
does  not  impair  competition.  to  the  five  member  states 
which  do not  have  such  a  system.  Another  question  of 
method is that of participation by the academic world in 
the  work of harmonizing Community laws;  here.  a  great 
task confronts the legal experts of the Six. 
Medium-term economic policy 
These.  then.  are  the  most  important  measures  aimed  at 
making competition an effective  instrument of integration 
and  guidance.  and  at keeping  it free  from  specific  and 
general  distortions.  At the  same time. it is  a  fact  that in 
various  spheres  action by  the  member states goes  further 
than these measures. especially in the financial field. About 
one-third of national incomes is channelled through'  public 
budgets.  State investments in public works such as roads. 
schools.  universities. hospitals. city  parks. and in promot­
ing  education.  research.  social  institutions.  etc..  are  not 
governed by  the  rules of the market. The same applies to 
measures taken by the public authorities as part of regional 
and development  policy.  aimed  at helping  less  favoured 
areas. Thirdly. there are state marketing arrangements and 
protective measures for particular sectors. such as agricul­
ture. energy. transport and housing. 
Some of these measures limit competition and interfere 
with the price mechanism; frequently the degree in whioh 
they achieve  their objectives is  inadequate. The first  task 
is  to see  how far  they  are really useful.  Where  they  are 
found  to  be  necessary.  the  second  essential  is  that  they 
should  be  effectively  and  systematically  applied.  With 
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short-term  ad  hoc  measures  in  particular,  care  must  be 
taken  to  ensure  that  their  indirect  and  longer-term 
consequences  are  taken  into account,  and  that  they  are 
not disjointed or contradictory. 
These dangers are also a very real threat to the integra­
tion of the Common Market and to its market order. With 
the national economies becoming increasingly open one to 
another.  economic  policy  measures  introduced  by  one 
member  state  have  repercussions  on  the  other  nations' 
economies  and  on the Community as  a  whole.  There  is 
therefore a  risk that the member states and the European 
Institutions  may  take decisions  without  sufficient  regard 
to their wider effects  on  the  Community's economy.  and 
that the  policies  of the  national  bodies  and  those  of the 
Community Institutions may develop along divergent lines. 
For these reasons  these different  measures must  be co­
ordinated.  rationalized.  and  directed  towards  common 
objectives.  Following  a  proposal  of the Commission.  the 
Council  of Ministers  th~fore unanimously  decided.  on 
April 13. 1964. to set up a Medium-Term Economic Policy 
Committee  attached to  the  Commission.  On the  basis  of 
this Committee's studies  the Commission,  after consulting 
the  European  Parliament  and  the  Economic  and  Social 
Committee,  will  submit  a  medium-term  economic  policy 
program  to the Council for  adoption. 
This program will be based essentially on the economic 
forecasts  of a  group of independent experts working with 
the Commission.  The group will discuss  the prospects for 
the next five years on the basis of all available information. 
and  will  work  out  medium-term  quantitative  projections 
with special reference to the origin and utilization of the 
expected gross Community product. To do this. an analysis 
of  the  economy  by  a  few  major sectors  (not  individual 
industries)  is  technically  essential. 
These forecasts are not growth targets. but are intended 
simply as pointers to the possible and probable economic 
trend In this  way  the  interventions  by  governments  and 
by  the  Community  Institutions  that  are  recognized  as 
necesaary  can  be  fitted  into  a  coherent  and systematic 
framework. while  influencing  the free  play of the  market 
only  to  an  extent  which  is  absolutely  necessary  and  is 
accepted by all the  responsible  authorities. 
Medium-term  co-ordination  thus  involves  an economic 
forecast  aimed  at  strengthening  and  completing  the 
competitive  system  and  an  economic  policy  based  upon 
competition.  Obviously.  as  was  explained  above  in con­
nection  with  short-term  economic  policy.  the  common 
competition policy cannot be successful unless the member 
countries follow a co-ordinated economic policy which does 
not run counter to it. 
Nor will the forecast expressly limit the freedom of either 
companies  or consumers,  for  it is  not  addressed directly 
to  them  but  exclusively  to  the  member  states  and  the 
European Institutions. The medium-term forecast is there- ~"') 
fore  a means of initiating a continuous, factual discussion  ',,­
of  economic-policy  aims  and  measures  and  of enabling 
incipient undesirable trends to be diagnosed in  time.  It is 
thus  destined  to make  a  vital contribution  to  integration 
and to the  establishment  of  a  coherent economic  policy 
based  on the common  competition  policy.  Consequently, 
the  Commission  has  placed  the  following  principle  pro­
minently  at  the  beginning  of  its  recommendation  on 
medium-term  economic  policy: 
"In sectors  in  which  there is  adequate competition. the 
free  play of the market is the most effective instrument to 
ensure  the  best use  of available  resources;  it is  a  funda­
mental  factor  making  for  economic  progress.  Therefore. 
an active policy is  required to maintain competition where 
it exists  and to  strengthen  it where  it  is  not  sufficiently 
effective." 
12 4  Competition policy in the Atlantic 
partnership 

The  above  chapter  completes  this  outline  of  the  most 
important tasks and instruments of intra-Community com­
petition policy.  But competition policy  also has a part to 
play in the  Atlantic partnership. What form  should guid­
ance of the international economic process take, especially 
with  regard  to  trade  between  the  Community  and  the 
United  States? 
Developments to date 
Negotiations are now under way for tariff reductions within 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT). 
These  negotiations.  known  as  the  Kennedy  Round,  were 
made possible through President Kennedy's Trade Expan­
sion  Act, which  empowered the  President. in  negotiations 
with  the  European  Community.  to make  a  50  per  cent 
reduction in  US  customs  duties.  This American  initiative 
for  an  Atlantic partnership was  taken  in  response  to the 
existence of the Community. its growing internal consolida­
tion  and its increasing  influence  on the  outside  world. 
Thus  'the  establishment  of  the  Community  has  set  in 
motion revolutionary changes in the  world economy in the 
direction  of freer  trade.  The  liberal external  trade  policy 
so far followed by the Community is evident from the fact 
that  its  initial  external  tariff  in  1958  was  already  lower 
than the  average  customs  tariff  previously  applied by the 
member states. Three further reductions have subsequently 
been  made  in  this  initial  1958  tariff  in  1961,  1962  and 
1963.  From  1958  to  1963,  imports  into  the  Community 
from  non-member countries rose  by  $7,900  million, or by 
49  per cent. whereas between  1953  and  1958 - before the 
Community was established  they went up by $5,200 mil­
lion.  These figures  speak for  themselves. 
Objectives 
The  idea  on  which  Atlantic  partnership  is  based  is  that 
the future Atlantic world will comprise two large entities ­
the United States and an integrated Europe - and that the 
association  between the two will  lead  to a  new  and freer 
structure for  their mutual trade.  These  entities should not 
be  isolated  from  each  other,  but  should  open  up  their 
markets to each other and thus contribute to the liberaliza­
tion  and  reorganization of world  trade. 
Clearly, the  reduction of customs duties  alone  will  not 
attain  this  objective,  for,  as  duties  are  reduced.  other 
obstacles  to  trade  gain  in  importance.  Measures  with  an 
effect sim·ilar to customs duties, i.e. the method of classify­
ing  items  in  customs  nomenclatures  and  the  methods  of 
valuing  them  for customs  purposes, can affect  and distort 
international  trade  just as  much as measures  which have 
nothing  to  do  with  customs,  such  as  dumping  practices, 
cartels. discrimination on the basis of nationality (such  as 
the  "Buy  American"  Act),  and  state  aids.  An Atlantic 
competition  policy  is  therefore  necessary  to  ensure  that 
unfair practices,  restrictions and distortions do not under­
mine  the  greater  freedom  of  action  which  industry  and 
trade  derive  from  tariff  cuts  and  the  resulting  keener 
competition. 
The  policy  necessary  to achieve  this  could  be  evolved 
by  expanding  the  Treaty's  rules  on  competition  and  the 
corresponding United States laws into rules for an "Atlantic 
Community"  endowed  with its own  legal personality and 
its  own  institutions.  Atlantic  partnership  means  consulta­
tion. not economic integration. It means not  the abandon­
ment  of  part of  sovereignty,  but agreement  on particular 
principles  and  rules  of  procedure  for  an  international 
system  based  on  competition. 
Principles and methods 
The first  principle  should  be  that free  trade  must  always 
be fair trade. Dumping practices must be excluded. Article 
VI  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT)  could  suffice  as  a  substantive  legal  standard. 
though the enforcing procedure seems  to require improve­
ment.  To deal  with  cases  of dumping,  a  system  of prior 
consultation and mutual help  among  the  authorities  con­
cerned could be envisaged. In addition. the special difficul­
ties  and  disadvantages  which  the  American  preliminary 
investigation  involves  for  European  importers  should  be 
eliminated. 
The Community has no common anti-dumping law, and 
to  this  extent  is  at a  disadvantage.  However.  the  Com­
mission has submitted proposals to the member states for 
common rules  to protect the  Community's trade. 
The  second  principle  should  be  that  Atlantic  trade 
should not be impeded by international cartels. It is  in  the 
interest both  of the  USA and of the Community that the 
opening-up of markets aimed at by tariff reductions should 
not  be  prevented  or  restricted  by  private  market-sharing 
or by  quota. price. export and import cartels. Admittedly, 
wherever  such  agreements  affect  competition  on  Com­
munity markets they fall under the Rome Treaty's rules of 
competition.  But difficult legal problems  arise when  these 
provisions  have  to  be  applied  to  companies  established 
abroad.  Furthermore. according  to American law.  cartels 
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for  exports to the  Common Market are admissible, under 
the  Webb-Pomerene Act. 
Conversely,  European cartels  for  exports to the United 
States do not come  under the Rome Treaty if the effects 
of  their  operations  are  limited  to the  American  market. 
American  anti-trust  law  may  forbid  them,  but it is  still 
difficult  for  the  US  to  enforce  their  anti-trust  legislation 
against European companies. Finally, Community law and 
American anti-trust law are often both applicable to inter­
national  market-sharing,  quota and price  cartels  because 
of  their  effects  on  both  markets;  in  these  circumstances, 
one wonders whether the activity of the anti-trust authori­
ties  ought not to be co-ordinated. 
A third principle could be that state aids, including tax 
preferences, should not be substituted for dismantled tariffs. 
The US  Trade Expansion Act contains certain provisions 
suggesting  that  the  authorities  should  consult  interested 
parties  before  they  consider  aids  to  compensate  for  the 
effects  of  tariff  reductions. 
Fourthly, foreigners should not be excluded from partici­
pation in public contracts. Here, from the European point 
of view,  the  main problem is  the  Buy  American Act. 
A  fifth  principle  would  be  a  ban  on  introducing  new 
measures  distorting  or  restricting  competition,  and  on 
strengthening  existing  measures,  without  reference  to the 
partner affected. 
Finally, it could be agreed that when restrictive non-tariff 
measures  are  detected  by  one  partner  it  should  take  no 
unilateral countermeasures until it has consulted the offend­
ing partner. It would perhaps even be possible to introduce 
an arbitration procedure, to be  resorted to if consultations 
prove  unsuccessful. 
All in all, it can be seen that Atlantic partnership means 
more  than  the  customary guarantee under  GATT of the 
formal  equality of opportunity for enterprise through  the 
application  of  the  most-favoured-nation  and  equal-treat­
ment principles. These principles represent a novel attempt 
to supplement the traditional  external-trade policy  of the 
tw~  partners by a few substantive and procedural principles ") 
WhICh  could  form  the  framework  for  rules  of  fair  com- ,~ 
petition at the  Atlantic level. 
14 5  The concept of competition within 
the Common Market 
Experience  shows  that  the  dismantling  of  internal duties 
and  quantitative  restrictions  and  the  building  up of the 
common external tariff have reached a stage at which the 
other. non-tariff and non-quota barriers to trade are having 
increasingly strong effects. 
It has been found that the quantitative steps  towards a 
customs  union  are  by  no  means  enough  to  ensure  an 
optimum  division  of  labour:  in  order  to  achieve  this. 
artificial distortions to competition must also be eliminated. 
This will  probably be possible only when the Community 
has a recognizably durable economic order of its own and 
the Community Institutions are able to maintain it.  Com­
petition  policy  in  the  Common  Market can only  succeed 
within the framework of an economic union. 
There is no other way of achieving the objective of the 
European  Economic  Community:  the  free.  federal-type 
economic  and  social system  which  is  the keystone  of the 
Rome Treaty. To attain it. the Treaty lays down that there 
shall be a system of undistorted competition. of which  the 
principles are defined  in  a series  of individual provisions. 
The Community's competition  policy  therefore  has  the 
two-fold  task  of  promoting  integration  of  markets  by 
eliminating  obstacles  to  competition  and  by  using  com­
petition  to  guide  the  economic  process  in  the  integrated 
market.  The common  competition  policy  must  therefore 
be  guided not by the concept of  a customs union  but by 
that of an  economic  union,  Le.  of six  domestic  markets 
gradually merging into one.  The aim is not just to evolve 
an international policy on competition, to be applied among 
the  member  states  - a  form  of  international  free-trade 
policy  - but to  lay  down  a  joint  Community  policy  on 
competition.  It  is  not  just  a  matter  of  increasing  trade 
between  the  member  states.  but  of  the  rules  by  which 
this trade is  regulated. Competition policy  does  not mean 
laissez-laire,  but  the  achievement  of  an  economic  order 
based  on  law. 
Such an order is  not an end in itself:  in the  economic 
sphere.  it must  promote  growth;  socially  it must lead to 
the  optimum  satisfaction  of  human  needs  and  the  fair 
distribution  of incomes.  and legally  and  sociologically  it 
must buttress the right of entrepreneurs and consumers to 
retain  their  economic  freedom.  This implies  rejection  of 
the idea that a simple customs union. or even a free  trade 
area. might  achieve  something fundamental in improving 
the international  division  of  labour.  The facts  prove  the 
contrary. 
As long as the common market is not completely estab­
lished. the chief task of competition policy will be to make 
competition effective  in trade between  the  member coun­
tries.  This  cannot  be  done  all  at once,  but only  step by 
step.  It requires  the  harmonization  and co-ordination  of 
the  various  measures  to  promote  competition.  and calls 
imperatively  for  a  unified. coherent  policy  in the  face  of 
the various public and private restrictions and distortions. 
The  Common  Market Commission  is  therefore  doing  its 
utmost to remove  trade barriers by simultaneous, parallel 
measures. 
However.  this  is  possible  only  to a  limited extent and, 
moreover.  is  not  always  necessary.  In certain  spheres  of 
economic  and  competition  policy,  delays  have  occurred. 
People  continually  insist  that  this  or  that  condition  of 
competition  must  be  harmonized  before  Community 
measures  to promote competition can be  introduced. This 
line of argument, however. is  seldom  sound; its approach 
is  static.  and  it  makes  every  single  move  dependent  on 
every  other move;  if it  were  accepted.  integration  would 
immediately come to a  stop. 
A  dynamic.  progressive  competition  policy  can neither 
tackle all obstacles at the same time nor wait until all the 
so-called  .. preconditions"  are  fulfilled  before  making  a 
move. It is  clear that conditions similar to those obtaining 
in a domestic market still do not exist, so that competition 
between  the  industries  of  the  Six  is  still  distorted  and 
limited; but it is  equally certain that many of the barriers 
to trade have already fallen. To this extent the Community's 
internal market  has long  since  come  into  operation. and 
competition has begun to play its part. The task now is to 
maintain  and  extend  it.  The  differences  between  com­
petition policy in the Community market and competition 
policy in a national market are not differences of kind but 
differences  of  degree.  Experience  has  shown  that  the 
transitional  difficulties  are  often  overestimated,  and  that 
the  economy  today is  more capable of adaptation than is 
generally supposed. Perfectionism in competition policy is 
therefore  just as  much  to be  eschewed  as  one-sided con­
centration  on  partial  sectors.  Only  through  constant  im­
provement  and progress  will  the  Community  achieve  the 
political  aim  it has  set  itself:  the  establishment  of  an 
economic  and  social  order consonant  with  the  needs  of 
~e twentieth  century~, 
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